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Time to Revisit Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies?
Abstract
In 2000, Congress decided to move away from a fixed-dollar-per-acre premium subsidy to a subsidy
percentage that applies to any crop insurance product offered. This change reduced the cost to farmers of
moving from yield insurance to revenue insurance by more than 50%. In addition, Congress decided to pay a
large proportion of the additional premium for higher coverage levels, paying for more than half the cost of
moving from the 65% to the 75% coverage level and about 25% of the additional cost of moving from 75% to
80% coverage. Not surprisingly, farmers responded to these lower costs by moving to more expensive revenue
insurance policies and higher coverage levels. This response is part of the reason why the Congressional
Budget Office projects that the cost of the crop insurance program exceeds $7 billion per year.
The changes to the premium subsidy structure were made in an era of projected budget surpluses. Does this
change still make sense now that federal deficits and overall debt levels are so high? How much could
spending be reduced if the premium subsidy structure were changed back? This policy briefing paper provides
insights into these questions.
Congress has demonstrated repeatedly that it wants a large proportion of acres to be enrolled in the crop
insurance program. The proven way to expand insured acreage is to subsidize farmers’ crop insurance
premiums with either a “lump sum” subsidy that gives farmers a set amount to participate in the program or a
proportional subsidy that pays a set fraction of a farmer’s premium. The added benefit to the crop insurance
industry of a proportional subsidy is that it incentivizes farmers to buy higher coverage levels and more
expensive revenue insurance.
If Congress had decided in 2010 to move away from the current system of proportional subsidies to the
amount of premium subsidy available for yield insurance, then the 2011 projected cost of the crop insurance
program would have declined by about $1.4 billion from the direct savings in premium subsidies, and by
another $300 million in lower underwriting gains as farmers moved away from expensive revenue insurance.
Further savings would accrue if premium subsidies were fixed at a set dollar amount because this would
remove the incentive for farmers to buy more crop insurance than they would buy if they were spending their
own money rather than taxpayer dollars. Total savings approaching $2 billion would likely accrue by simply
returning to the premium structure that we had before the Agricultural Risk Protection Act.
Farmers would respond to this policy change by buying less revenue insurance and lower coverage levels. This
would also reduce their out-of-pocket expenditures. Farm groups would undoubtedly oppose this change, but
such opposition would be tempered if the choice were between this change and a reduction in a more valued
program, such as direct payments.
Underwriting gains to crop insurance companies would decline significantly. Both companies and agents
would have the most to lose from this policy change so they would be expected to oppose it strongly. But in an
era of tight budgets, the tax dollars spent on subsidies that incentivize farmers to buy more and different types
of crop insurance than they would buy with their own dollars could fall under intense scrutiny.
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Executive Summary 
 
 
In 2000, Congress decided to move away from a fixed-dollar-per-acre premium 
subsidy to a subsidy percentage that applies to any crop insurance product offered. This 
change reduced the cost to farmers of moving from yield insurance to revenue insurance 
by more than 50%. In addition, Congress decided to pay a large proportion of the 
additional premium for higher coverage levels, paying for more than half the cost of 
moving from the 65% to the 75% coverage level and about 25% of the additional cost of 
moving from 75% to 80% coverage. Not surprisingly, farmers responded to these lower 
costs by moving to more expensive revenue insurance policies and higher coverage 
levels. This response is part of the reason why the Congressional Budget Office projects 
that the cost of the crop insurance program exceeds $7 billion per year. 
The changes to the premium subsidy structure were made in an era of projected 
budget surpluses. Does this change still make sense now that federal deficits and overall 
debt levels are so high? How much could spending be reduced if the premium subsidy 
structure were changed back? This policy briefing paper provides insights into these 
questions. 
Congress has demonstrated repeatedly that it wants a large proportion of acres to 
be enrolled in the crop insurance program. The proven way to expand insured acreage is 
to subsidize farmers’ crop insurance premiums with either a “lump sum” subsidy that 
gives farmers a set amount to participate in the program or a proportional subsidy that 
pays a set fraction of a farmer’s premium. The added benefit to the crop insurance 
industry of a proportional subsidy is that it incentivizes farmers to buy higher coverage 
levels and more expensive revenue insurance. 
If Congress had decided in 2010 to move away from the current system of 
proportional subsidies to the amount of premium subsidy available for yield insurance, 
then the 2011 projected cost of the crop insurance program would have declined by about 
$1.4 billion from the direct savings in premium subsidies, and by another $300 million 
in lower underwriting gains as farmers moved away from expensive revenue insurance. 
Further savings would accrue if premium subsidies were fixed at a set dollar amount 
because this would remove the incentive for farmers to buy more crop insurance than 
they would buy if they were spending their own money rather than taxpayer dollars. 
Total savings approaching $2 billion would likely accrue by simply returning to the 
premium structure that we had before the Agricultural Risk Protection Act. 
Farmers would respond to this policy change by buying less revenue insurance 
and lower coverage levels. This would also reduce their out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Farm groups would undoubtedly oppose this change, but such opposition would be 
tempered if the choice were between this change and a reduction in a more valued 
program, such as direct payments.  
Underwriting gains to crop insurance companies would decline significantly. 
Both companies and agents would have the most to lose from this policy change so they 
would be expected to oppose it strongly. But in an era of tight budgets, the tax dollars 
spent on subsidies that incentivize farmers to buy more and different types of crop 
insurance than they would buy with their own dollars could fall under intense scrutiny. 
 
Keywords: crop insurance, premium subsidies, program costs, revenue insurance. 
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Time to Revisit Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies? 
 
By Bruce A. Babcock 
 
Congressional passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000 ushered 
in a dramatic increase in the taxpayer cost of the crop insurance program. This cost 
increase was largely due to a change in the way farmers’ premiums were subsidized. 
Before ARPA, the dollar amount of farmers’ insurance premiums paid for by taxpayers 
was strictly limited to 41.7% of the cost of a 65% yield insurance policy. This policy has a 
35% deductible so it protects farmers against yield declines that are greater than 35% of 
their average yield. Farmers could buy a lower deductible policy, but taxpayers would not 
pay any portion of the additional cost. They could also choose to buy a revenue insurance 
policy that protects against unexpected drops in revenue. But, again, the dollar amount 
of taxpayer support would not increase even though revenue insurance typically costs 
more than yield insurance. 
  
There are two reasons why this pre-ARPA type of premium subsidy structure makes 
sense. First, the mere existence of a premium subsidy encourages farmers to buy crop 
insurance, thereby lessening the financial impact of widespread crop losses and possibly 
lessening the need for Congress to pass ad hoc disaster assistance programs. Second, 
because the dollar amount of the premium subsidy is fixed, farmers will choose the level 
and type of crop insurance that best meets their risk management needs, rather than 
choosing insurance based on how much it is subsidized. With a fixed subsidy, farmers 
will more carefully weigh the costs and benefits of moving to revenue insurance or 
moving to lower deductible policies because they would pay the full additional cost. 
Before ARPA, farmers chose their crop insurance levels in much the same way that 
homeowners and automobile drivers choose deductible levels on their insurance 
policies—by judging whether the benefits of a lower deductible policy are worth the 
additional (unsubsidized) costs. 
 
This seemingly sensible way of managing premium subsidies all changed after ARPA. 
The first change was that taxpayers paid 59% of the premium for a 65% yield policy 
instead of 41.7%. Also, this 59% subsidy was extended to more expensive 65% revenue 
insurance policies. This change meant that instead of paying 100% of the extra cost of 
moving to revenue insurance, farmers only had to pay 41% of the cost. Farmers 
responded to this dramatic cost reduction as one would expect: they moved dramatically 
away from yield insurance and toward revenue insurance.  
 
The second change was that Congress also decided to put lower deductible policies on 
sale. Instead of paying 100% of the additional cost of moving to a 30% deductible policy, 
farmers only had to pay 41% of the cost. Figure 1 shows that the taxpayer contribution 
for lower deductible (higher coverage level) policies declines as coverage increases, but it 
is not until policyholders move from 80% to 85% coverage that the taxpayer contribution 
becomes insignificant.  
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Figure 1. Proportions paid by taxpayers and farmers for higher crop 
insurance coverage levels 
 
 
It turns out that farmers are just like clothes shoppers: when a sale is on, product moves. 
A comparison of Figure 2—coverage levels that Iowa and Kansas farmers purchased in 
1998—and Figure 3—levels purchased in 2002—shows the dramatic increase in coverage 
levels after ARPA.1 Figure 4 shows that farmers also moved dramatically toward revenue 
insurance policies after ARPA. With the exception of Iowa soybean farmers, most 
farmers chose to move to revenue insurance soon after higher ARPA subsidies put the 
product on sale. Today, about 90% of farmers choose revenue insurance.  
 
That farmers responded to lower prices for insurance by buying more insurance is to be 
expected. But the budget cost consequences of the ARPA premium subsidy structure are 
likely not fully understood, so an up-to-date estimate of these costs should be of interest, 
especially given the sharp attention being paid to federal spending right now. But before 
the cost impacts are presented, a fresh look at the justification for offering farmers 
subsidized revenue insurance is needed. 
                                                 
1 Coverage levels above 75% were not available in 1998. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of insured acres at each coverage level by state and 
crop in 1998 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of insured acres at each coverage level by state and 
crop in 2002 
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Figure 4. Revenue insurance share of insured acres in 1998, 2002, and 2010 
 
 
How Crop Insurance Covers Price Risk 
The move away from a fixed-dollar subsidy to a fixed-percent subsidy is responsible 
for at least a portion of the large movement to revenue insurance over the last 10 
years. Because revenue insurance policies insure against adverse price changes, part 
of revenue insurance premiums covers price risk. This means that taxpayers are 
subsidizing farmers’ management of price risk. A fundamental tenet of capitalism is 
that most economic goods and services should be provided by the private sector, 
because this generally results in the allocation of resources to their highest value use. 
Only if the private sector cannot efficiently provide the good is there some 
justification for government stepping in. The private sector offers abundant tools to 
corn, soybean, wheat, and cotton producers to help them manage their price risk, 
including forward contracts, futures contracts, options on futures contracts, and 
customized marketing tools such as average price contracts. Why then should 
taxpayers be providing price insurance? Is the private sector so inefficient that the 
government needs to step in? Answering this question requires an explanation of 
what revenue insurance actually does. 
 
The crop insurance program offers two types of revenue insurance. The first type is 
called “Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion.” Farmers who select this 
coverage are offered a revenue guarantee based on their own yield history and on the 
level of harvest-time futures price just before the insurance contract is signed. The 
revenue guarantee equals the product of the selected coverage level (from 50% to 85% in 
5% increments), the level of futures prices, and the average of past farm yields. For 
example, insurance prices for the 2011 crops are $6.01/bu, $13.49/bu, $9.89/bu, 
$7.15/bu, and $1.23/cwt for corn, soybeans, spring wheat, winter wheat, and cotton, 
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respectively. So, for example, an Iowa corn producer with an average yield of 180 
bu/acre who selects 80% coverage has purchased a revenue guarantee of $865/ac. At 
harvest, this farmer’s actual revenue is calculated by multiplying actual yield by the 
harvest-time futures prices. If actual revenue turns out to be lower than $865/ac then 
the farmer is paid the difference. 
 
USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) calculates that the amount of premium needed 
to cover the insurance payouts for this coverage is $48 per acre in 2011. This $48 does 
not cover the company cost of delivering the insurance, and it does not include a 
premium subsidy. If this Calhoun County farmer purchases yield insurance instead of 
revenue insurance, the comparable premium would be $33. This means that RMA has 
determined that adding price risk coverage adds $15 per acre in cost. Yield insurance at 
the 80% coverage level would protect this farmer against any yield below 144 bu/ac. 
 
Private Provision of Price Insurance 
The private sector offers two ways that this farmer could manage price risk. One way is 
for the farmer to sell futures contracts (or agree to sell in a forward market). If harvest-
time futures prices drop, then the farmer would make up on the futures market what he 
lost when the crop is sold at harvest. If futures rise, then the farmer makes up in the 
marketplace what is lost on the futures. Thus, by using futures, the farmer has effectively 
locked in a price. A second way to insure against price drops is for the farmer to buy put 
options on futures contracts. These put options give the farmer the right to sell a futures 
contract at the current price, but not the obligation. So if futures rise, the farmer chooses 
not to exercise the option. If futures fall, the farmer exercises the option and sells futures 
at the higher price, thereby offsetting the drop in the market. 
 
The cost of these price risk management tools varies from negligible for futures and 
forward contracts to sizeable for the put options. The cost of buying a $6.00 corn put 
option on the harvest-time futures contract is about 70¢ per bushel or about $100 per 
acre if this farmer wants an ironclad guarantee of a $6.00 price for 144 bushels per acre.  
 
This high cost raises the obvious question of how RMA can estimate that price risk adds 
only $15 per acre in cost to revenue insurance when the private sector seemingly prices 
the cost of $6.00 price insurance at $100 per acre. The answer is that put options 
provide price insurance that always pays out if price falls below $6.00. Revenue 
insurance only pays out if revenue—price times yield—falls below $865 per acre. Most of 
the time when the farmer’s price insurance would pay out, the farmer’s revenue 
insurance would not pay out because revenue did not fall below the revenue guarantee. 
This means that the farmer who buys price and yield insurance separately will pay much 
more (but will receive commensurately more payments) than a farmer who buys revenue 
insurance. Thus, revenue insurance offered by the government is not the same thing as 
price insurance offered by the private sector.  
 
Insuring Lost Bushels at the Market Price 
An alternative to high-priced put options is to just offer farmers yield insurance and then 
let them forward contract their crop to manage their price risk. In principle, the Calhoun 
County farmer could buy yield insurance that guarantees 144 bu/ac while forward 
contracting 144 bu/ac to the local elevator to insure the $6.00 price. This gives the 
farmer the same revenue guarantee as revenue insurance at less cost. Although many, if 
not most, farmers do forward sell their crops, there is a significant risk in doing so. This 
risk arises if the farmer does not produce enough to fulfill the forward contract and the 
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market price increases. When this happens, the farmer who signed the forward contract 
must go into the market to buy higher-priced bushels to deliver at the agreed-upon 
forward price. For example, suppose the Calhoun County farmer insures 144 bu/ac with 
yield insurance, produces only 100 bu/ac, and the market price rises to $7.00 per bushel. 
The farmer delivers the 100 bu/ac and needs to purchase 44 bu/ac of additional corn to 
deliver. This corn costs $308 to buy. The farmer gets an indemnity from his yield 
insurance of $264 per acre ($6.00 multiplied by the 44 bu yield loss), but then he is 
short $44 per acre. That is, under this scenario, the farmer loses $44 per acre even 
though he had locked in price through the forward contract and yield through the yield 
insurance contract. 
 
The second form of revenue insurance, called simply “Revenue Protection,” covers this 
type of risk. It is by far the most popular form of revenue insurance, with more than 90% 
of farmers buying it. Revenue Protection offers the same downside revenue insurance as 
Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion, but in addition, it provides insurance 
against a farmer having to go into a higher-priced market to fulfill the terms of a forward 
contract. RMA has determined that $71 is needed to cover payouts to the Calhoun 
County farmer who buys 80% coverage under Revenue Protection. This is $38 per acre 
more than yield insurance. Revenue Protection is more expensive because if harvest-time 
futures are higher than the futures prices used to set the initial revenue guarantee, then 
the revenue guarantee reflects the harvest-time futures. This increase means that any 
yield loss will be valued at the higher harvest-time futures prices if futures move higher. 
This feature covers the risk of a farmer producing fewer bushels than is forward 
contracted. 
 
Premium Subsidy as a Driver of Crop Insurance Decisions 
Figure 5 shows how much the per-acre premium subsidy varies across the three types of 
insurance for the Calhoun County corn farmer at various coverage levels. It is easy to see 
that the dollar amount of premium subsidy can be altered dramatically by the type of 
insurance and the amount of insurance a farmer chooses to buy. This figure explains a 
great deal about which products farmers currently buy. 
 
If a farmer wants to maximize the dollar amount of insurance, then purchasing Revenue 
Protection at the 80% or 85% coverage level accomplishes this. But, as we saw in Figure 
1, farmers must pay almost all of the additional cost when they move from 80% to 85%, 
so most farmers do not choose the 85% coverage level. In addition, farmers must pay 
about 75% of the incremental premium moving from 75% to 80%. This means that many 
farmers simply do not find that the pursuit of higher premium subsidies is cost effective.  
 
Most Iowa farmers have decided that the 70% and 75% coverage levels strike the right 
balance between out-of-pocket expense and the ability to garner more subsidy (see 
Figure 3). Many Kansas farmers insure at the 65% coverage level. It is interesting to note 
that Kansas wheat farmers who choose the 65% coverage and Revenue Protection receive 
more of a subsidy than if they choose 75% yield insurance. 
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Figure 5. Per-acre premium subsidy for 80% corn coverage in Calhoun 
County 
 
Does Crop Insurance Crowd Out Provision of Private Price Insurance? 
The private sector does an outstanding job of providing farmers with the ability to buy 
price insurance with put options and to forward sell their crop. But revenue insurance is 
not price insurance because a price drop is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for revenue to drop. Rather, revenue insurance is a more cost-effective insurance 
mechanism than separate price and yield insurance. This means that unless the private 
sector is being prevented from offering revenue insurance policies because of the 
existence of the crop insurance program, there is no direct crowding out. In fact, a strong 
argument can be made that by lowering the risk of a yield shortfall, Revenue Protection 
actually enhances farmers’ ability to forward sell their crop.  
 
This, then, raises the question of why taxpayers should cover a large portion of the 
additional cost of revenue insurance if it is such a superior risk management tool. This 
question is best answered with an analysis of who actually benefits when farmers 
respond to subsidies by increasing their coverage levels and the purchase of revenue 
insurance.  
 
Impact of Moving Back to a Fixed-Dollar-Per-Acre Subsidy 
Suppose that Congress had begun its cost-cutting moves last year and decided to limit 
2011 premium subsidies to the dollar amount available for yield insurance at any 
particular coverage level. How much would this save?2 Well, the estimate is complicated 
                                                 
2 Savings estimates described here are based on author assumptions about how the Congressional Budget 
Office would estimates cost savings. Actual cost savings will not typically equal CBO estimates of cost 
savings. 
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because all coverage levels and all insurance products for each county and crop have to 
be considered. An indication of the amount that would be saved can be made by 
calculating the cost savings assuming that each farmer buys 75% coverage and then 
multiplying the reduction in per-acre premium subsidies by the total number of acres 
insured. 
 
Figure 6 gives some results for the largest state-crop combinations for corn, soybeans, 
wheat, and cotton. Not surprisingly, those states that have the highest participation in 
crop insurance would generate the most savings in premium subsidies. Across all states 
for these four crops, the total reduction in premium subsidies would be almost $1.4 
billion.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Reduction in premium subsidies by state and crop from limiting 
subsidies to those available for yield insurance 
 
If this change were actually made, the cost savings would be greater than the $1.4 billion 
reduction in premium subsidies. Such a policy change would have farmers pay 100% of 
the additional cost of moving from yield insurance to revenue insurance. Many farmers 
would choose not to make this move. Some would drop out of the program; others would 
buy the less expensive Revenue Protection with the Harvest Price Exclusion; and still 
others would buy only yield insurance. Because all three impacts would reduce the total 
premium in the program, underwriting gains would also decline.3 If the total premium in 
                                                 
3 Administrative and operating reimbursements will decline if the move away from revenue insurance 
causes these reimbursements to fall below their capped amount, in which case the estimated costs savings 
would increase. 
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the program dropped by, say, 20% ($2 billion), cost savings would total an additional 
$300 million per year.4 
  
Even more savings could be had if the dollar amount of the premium subsidy were fixed 
rather than varying with the coverage level. Farmers would then respond to this change 
by not only changing the type of insurance that they purchased but also the coverage 
level. Statistical analysis suggests that only 50% of farmers would want to buy more than 
65% coverage if higher-than-65% coverage levels were not subsidized.5 Presumably the 
50% that would not buy more insurance would find more cost-effective ways to manage 
risk than with crop insurance. These farmers would still choose to participate in the 
program to capture the fixed-dollar subsidies, but they would not buy more costly 
coverage levels. 
 
The total dollar savings from moving to a fixed-dollar-per-acre amount of subsidy for 
crop insurance would likely approach $2 billion per year at current price levels. Note that 
these savings accrue not because any program or subsidy is eliminated but simply from a 
change in the way that farmers are subsidized. Moving to a fixed-dollar amount of 
subsidy per acre rather than a complex set of subsidies that increases the demand for 
high-cost coverage levels and revenue insurance policies would generate this magnitude 
of savings. 
 
Political Feasibility of Changing Premium Subsidies 
In writing ARPA, if Congress had chosen to leave the premium subsidy structure alone in 
the crop insurance program, the program cost to taxpayers over the last 10 years would 
be significantly lower than it actually was. Because farmers are more frugal with their 
own dollars than with taxpayer dollars, a policy that maintained a fixed-dollar amount of 
premium subsidy would have resulted in farmers buying lower coverage levels, more 
yield insurance, and less expensive forms of revenue insurance. Participation in the 
program would have been nearly as high in terms of total acres insured, but there would 
have been far fewer premium dollars in the program. That is, farmers would have 
adjusted to higher prices for insurance by buying less insurance.  
 
However, making this move now would generate significant opposition because in policy 
and politics, it is not easy to take away or change an existing program. It would be a 
surprise if any farm advocacy groups come out in favor of changing the way that 
premium subsidies for farmers are calculated. But if given a choice between changing 
how premium subsidies are structured and cutting a program such as direct payments, 
many farmers would likely opt to keep direct payments. 
 
A more difficult hurdle to overcome would be opposition from the crop insurance 
industry, including crop insurance agents. Because industry revenue depends on 
premiums generated, policy changes that have the potential to reduce total premiums 
are usually opposed by the industry. Congress, particularly the U.S. Senate, has revealed 
itself to be strongly in favor of taxpayer support for the crop insurance industry, so a 
move back to the old premium subsidy structure would be difficult to achieve. 
 
                                                 
4 This assumes an expected net underwriting gain of 15% of total premium. 
5 See Babcock, B.A., “The Politics and Economics of the U.S. Crop Insurance Program,” National Bureau 
of Economic Research, volume on agricultural economics, forthcoming. 
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But Congress seems poised to cut popular federal programs, including food and 
agricultural programs. Perhaps faced with explicit trade-offs between competing 
programs, such as funding for infants from poor families versus funding for food stamp 
recipients, or funding for the current premium subsidies versus funding for direct 
payments, Congress and advocacy groups will find that the $2 billion annual cost savings 
from a simple change in calculating crop insurance premium subsidies are just too good 
to pass up.  
 
 
Bruce A. Babcock is a professor of economics at Iowa State University and director of 
the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development. 
